Des chercheurs ont plaidé vendredi à Kinshasa pour la "cogestion intégrée" des frontières africaines à
l'issue de deux journées d'échanges organisées par une structure de l'armée de la République démocratique du Congo, pays qui partage ses frontières avec neuf voisins.
l'issue de deux journées d'échanges organisées par une structure de l'armée de la République démocratique du Congo, pays qui partage ses frontières avec neuf voisins.
Il faut "promouvoir l'idée de coopération, de cogestion des frontières", ont recommandé des participants au terme d'un colloque international organisé par le Collège de Hautes Etudes de Stratégie et de Défense (CHESD) de la RDC.
Ces assises ont réuni des experts venus du Bénin, du Congo-Brazzaville, de la France et de la RDC, sous le thème : "Frontières africaines entre souveraineté, sécurité et développement".
"La cogestion intégrée permet à la fois de pacifier les espaces transfrontaliers, donc les relations entre les États, mais également de promouvoir des initiatives qui vont au-delà de la simple cohabitation pacifique entre les États", a déclaré le professeur Cyril Musila, chef du département d'études doctrinales et de recherches stratégiques du CHESD.
"Il faut donc développer une véritable politique de cogestion transfrontalière intégrée pour lutter contre toutes les formes de violences, de criminalité", a-t-il insisté.
L'un des objectifs du colloque était de chercher à comprendre les différents défis auxquels font face les communautés régionales africaines et les États afin de rendre leurs frontières "fluides, viables, sûres, pacifiques" et propices à une coopération pour le développement socio-économique des peuples africains, ont expliqué les intervenants.
Le ministre congolais de la Défense, Crispin Atama Thabe, a estimé que "les défis majeurs pour les États africains au sujet de l'exercice de leur souveraineté concernent moins les tracés des frontières que le contrôle effectif de ces territoires".
La RDC gère des frontières longues de 10.292 km partagées avec neuf pays, ainsi qu'un littoral de 42 km sur l'océan Atlantique.
"Ces frontières sont protégées de manière déficitaire", a reconnu M. Atama.
Grand pays d'Afrique centrale, la RDC a été ravagée par deux guerres entre 1996 et 2003, soutenues par ses voisins de l'Est notamment. Sa partie orientale est en proie à des violences armées depuis plus de vingt ans.
Créé en janvier 2016, le CHESD congolais relève de l'autorité du chef d'État-major général des armées de la RDC.
VOA Avec AFP
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How The IPhone Changed Apple In 10 Years- US Cyber Diplomacy Has Bigger Problems Than the Closure of its Coordination Office .S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson delivers a statement to the press at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on June 9, 2017. BY DAVID FIDLER VISITING FELLOW FOR CYBERSECURITY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS READ BIO JULY 26, 2017 TOPICS COMMENTARY CYBER STATE DEPARTMENT STATE DEPARTMENT AA FONT SIZE + PRINT Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email this article The Trump administration isn’t making it a foreign policy priority. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s decision to close the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues and fold its responsibilities into the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs has provoked widespread criticism. Critics often express two arguments. First, the decision signals that the Trump administration is downgrading cyber’s importance in U.S. foreign policy. Second, the decision means the United States will forgo the benefits a cyber-focused unit within the State Department can generate. Neither argument is persuasive, which undermines calls for the Trump administration to maintain the office. It was clear well before Secretary Tillerson’s decision that the Trump administration was not going to emphasize cyberspace in foreign policy as the Obama administration did. Closing the cyber coordinator’s office is consistent with the Trump administration’s marginalization of cyber issues in foreign policy. Nothing communicates this attitude better than the White House’s refusal to confront Russia’s cyber interference in the 2016 election and, instead, express a desire to establish a joint cybersecurity unit with Russia. Closing the office is also consistent with the administration’s marginalization of the State Department in its “America First” foreign policy. Retaining the office would not, by itself, change the administration’s attitude about cyber within foreign policy or about the State Department. The office could only generate traction if the administration acted as if cyber issues were strategic priorities for the United States, which is not presently the case. The notion that continuing the cyber coordinator’s office might produce a “trickle up” effect that transforms the administration’s outlook seems far-fetched. Triggering such a transformation requires targeting people and processes higher up the foreign-policy food chain than a State Department unit. Criticism of Secretary Tillerson’s decision also often overstates the benefits a cyber coordinator’s office can produce for U.S. foreign policy. The period in which the office functioned can hardly be considered a golden age of U.S. cyber diplomacy. Created in February 2011, the office contributed to diplomatic achievements, such as the U.S.-China agreement on economic cyber espionage. However, the U.S. government also struggled to achieve important foreign policy objectives in cyberspace despite diplomatic efforts supported by the White House. The Obama administration anchored its International Strategy for Cyberspace (2011) in protecting “our core commitments to fundamental freedoms, privacy, and the free flow of information.” In the years that followed, internet freedom has declined around the world, privacy is increasingly under threat, and the free flow of information has become more endangered. These difficulties occurred despite the skill of State Department officials working directly on cyber issues. During the office’s existence, the political context for cyber diplomacy deteriorated in ways that made progress difficult to achieve and sustain. Revelations about secret U.S. cyber activities, including Stuxnet and National Security Agency programs disclosed by Edward Snowden, adversely affected U.S. legitimacy and influence globally. Divergent national interests on a range of issues—including cybercrime, privacy, freedom of expression, and terrorist exploitation of the internet—proved frustrating to reconcile, even among like-minded democracies. Authoritarian governments asserted their perspectives, practices, and power more aggressively, creating an ideological fault-line running through almost all cyber policy questions. Cyber issues, especially cybersecurity, became caught in the vortex of worsening geopolitics among China, Russia, and the United States. The difficulties U.S. cyber diplomacy faced during the time the cyber coordinator’s office operated demonstrate that having such an office is not an indicator or guarantee of diplomatic success. None of the political problems that tormented U.S. cyber diplomacy during the Obama administration has disappeared. Indeed, in some areas, the problems are getting worse. Efforts by the U.S. government in the UN Group of Governmental Experts to achieve consensus on international law’s application in cyberspace appear to have had only ephemeral effect, with China and Russia abandoning this consensus in the latest round of GGE talks. Now, cyber norms are for the “good guys,” who need them the least, and cyber deterrence of the “bad guys” has not proved effective. Re-constituting the State Department’s cyber office will not, by itself, provide an effective way to navigate the increasingly turbulent international politics of cyberspace. In sum, keeping the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues only makes sense if the White House makes cyber diplomacy a foreign policy priority, develops a comprehensive strategy that addresses the challenges U.S. interests in cyberspace face, and empowers the State Department to implement the strategy. The prospects for these preconditions appearing soon are grim. In this context, whether the State Department has a cyber coordinator’s office is not the most important question for the future of U.S. cyber diplomacy.
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